Does Basra Need a Czar?

There has been several news reports in the past few weeks about Prime Minister Adil Abd Al-Mahdi assigning Hadi Al-Ameri the responsibility to address Basra’s extensive problems. While there has yet to be an official announcement, its seems that Ameri has been engaged with some day-to-day operations related to Basra province, which has now certain media outlets referring to him as the ‘Czar of Basra’.

This appointment, be it unofficial, could be a huge opportunity for Ameri. Getting things right in Basra, which has been suffering from a severe service crisis could mean larger popular support for him and his party, the Badr Organization. Any success in Ameri’s new role who had, and probably still has, ambitions to become prime minister and who would count on his connections and political leverage rather than his professional experience, could allow him to score important political points. Something he greatly needs as his party currently faces internal strife.

With Basra’s political climate in a dire situation due to its service crisis mixed with extreme levels of corruption, this appointment could also turn into a political swamp if Ameri fails to make a difference. Success is not a guarantee, given the challenges Basra faces. Therefore, while the Prime Minister might use Ameri to shield himself from some of the pressure that will be coming from the anticipated unrest in Basra this summer, this appointment could also backfire and cost them both dearly in terms of political capital.

Apart from the political implication and the risk involved, part of the logic behind this appointment could be valid. Iraq watchers remember very well how Sayyid Ahmed Al-Safi, one of the representatives of Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani travelled last summer to Basra and was able to resolve in a matter of days the issue of salt water a few areas had been suffering from for a long time.

This revealed two important aspects of the crisis plaguing Basra. The first being that a large part is caused at the lower levels of the service-providing chain, and the lack of follow-up on the ground rendered any good policies and progress on the top level ineffective. The second is that the intervention from a person with enough influence can go a long way in resolving technical and practical issues on the ground and play a big role in resolving the crisis, at least on the short-term. Therefore, it is fair to assume that some progress could be made if a strong figure who directly oversees the services crisis in Basra was appointed. In other words, the idea of having special appointees with sufficient authority and power to engage in resolving technical issues is not a bad one.

However, the Prime Minister needs to do this in a better way. Instead of appointing the leader of a political bloc informally and engage in some unnecessary political risk, the Prime Minister needs to formally appoint non-political and dedicated professional people to oversee the services plaguing the province. These appointees should have the right skills, a clear role, and enough authority to point out the bottlenecks in the services supply chain and report back directly to the prime minister who will provide full support in order to resolve them. 

McKinsey & Company, a top global consulting company published a few weeks ago a study documenting the experience of some American states in appointing Chief Operating Officers (COOs) in order to “lead strategic operations and implement high-priority projects”. In the private sector, the post of the COO is a well-established position, especially in manufacturing, who often plays the role of right-hand deputy of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO). A COO is responsible for streamlining the operation process, all aspects of logistics, and is accountable for producing results. The McKinsey study defines the broad role of a public sector COO as an operation-focused member of a state-administration who “can round out the skill sets in an administration and take a long-term view of key management priorities”.

A similar post could be established in Iraq, at least for a temporary basis, to tackle Basra’s services. The key here is that the state-COO’s mandate is matched with that of the administration’s priorities. The McKinsey study highlights three prerequisites in order for the state-COO to be successful:

1. The candidate needs to have the right profile: the state-COO needs to be a professional who has the ability to network and influence people. While being appointed by the prime minister would give a COO in Iraq enough power and leverage to get things done, without the sufficient technical expertise and the right personality, not much progress can be made in complicated issues like service-delivery, especially in Iraq where expertise is scarce and even technical matters are highly-politicized.
2. Explicit roles and responsibilities: it is essential that the state-COO is non-political. As the McKinsey report points out, “[p]oliticized COOs are also more likely to face resistance when enacting change, which can prevent them from accomplishing their goals”. This is why the roles and responsibilities of a state-COO for Basra should be made explicit and focused on resolving the water and electricity crises in the city, instead of being general and wide-arching in order to ensure the success of the COO’s mission.
3. Power to build teams: the state-COO should have the liberty to choose his own team who he can work with in order to improve the situation of services, without being politically pressured to hire certain people as it happens in Iraq when it comes to government appointments.

Without a doubt, establishing the post of state-COO, even on a short-term solution, will anger some federal and local authorities as they will see in this appointment an attempt to undermine their authorities. However, the citizens of Basra need services and they cannot wait for the federal and local authorities to resolve their chronic issues. Any solution that will bypass bureaucracy, corruption, and mismanagement in order to provide services should be welcomed. In the future, long-term solutions should be designed to prevent the services crisis in Basra.