Aligning his Ataa movement with then Iraqi Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadi during the May 2018 elections, Falih Al-Fayyadh, Iraq’s National Security Advisor since 2011, made a pragmatic bet. For Fayyadh to head the Iraqi National Security Service, retain his influential NSA post, and his Chairmanship of the Popular Mobilization Commission (PMC) — a coalition of Iraqi paramilitaries — running Ataa with Abadi’s Nasr list was smart politics. The US-backed Abadi led the campaign to recapture Da’ish held territory that culminated only months before the race, and the premier’s firm response to the 2017 Kurdish Independence Referendum won plaudits from numerous Iraqis. But, Nasr received a thumping in the polls, coming in a surprising third place.
By August 2018, Ataa lawmakers close to Fayyadh, who were skeptical of the prime minister winning enough support to obtain a second term, abandoned the Nasr alliance, despite Fayyadh serving under Abadi for four years and joined the rival Iran-leaning Bina coalition. Abadi fired Fayyadh for politicizing part of the security apparatus only to see an Iraqi court overturn his dismissal and Fayyadh reassume his posts in December 2018 under new Prime Minister Adil Abd Al-Mahdi. Despite Fayyadh receiving the backing of Iran’s closest allies in Baghdad for interior minister, he isn’t a rigid ideologue. Fayyadh has repeatedly zigzagged between rival Iraqi politicians with contrasting outlooks in a bid to further his own ambitions.
At times, Fayyadh has offered a concerned appraisal of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) which have been accused of illegally smuggling oil and human rights violations. In an interview, a State Department official explained that Fayyadh had “consistently warned about the dangers of the PMF in candid, private conversations.” During 2014 and 2015, Fayyadh cautioned the PMF was “getting out of control,” according to the US diplomat who attended multiple meetings with Fayyadh and summarized the Iraqi National Security Advisor’s remarks. Given the PMF’s popularity across much of Iraq’s Shia population due to their critical role in combatting ISIS, Fayyadh discussing the PMF’s “danger,” shows he had a more nuanced view of the paramilitary organization.
The State Department official emphasized that Fayyadh was “very pragmatic.” Despite serving as chairman of the PMF, Fayyadh has regularly met with US officials for over a decade, including a sit-down last month with US Envoy to Combat Da’ish James Jeffrey. “We have always been aware of his [Fayyadh]’s disparate ties to various unsavory folks,” the US official noted. “It is also one of the things that made Fayyadh useful over the years. He could talk to pretty much anybody in the region. He… let us know what they were saying and provided us with really helpful insights: inside Iraq and out.”
As expected, Fayyadh has on numerous occasions publicly backed the importance of the PMF, which he formally heads along with the influential Deputy Chairman Abu Mahdi Al-Muhandis. “The PMF is for Iraq and for everyone,” declared Fayyadh in a November video accompanied by dramatic music posted on his official Facebook page. Visiting wounded PMF fighters, while also joining them in the field, Fayyadh is keen on highlighting his loyalty to Iraq’s paramilitaries in public forums.
Born in Baghdad, Fayyadh graduating from the University of Mosul in 1977 with a degree in electrical engineering. He became a member of the Islamic Dawa party, rebelling against Saddam Hussein’s regime. In 1980, Fayyadh was arrested and spent five years in the notorious Abu Ghraib prison.
Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki nominated Fayyadh, for National Security Advisor in 2011. By 2014, Da’ish seized one-third of Iraq’s territory and five divisions of the Iraqi Security Forces melted in the face of Da’ish fighters. “There was nothing in the background of Falih Al-Fayyadh that prepared him for a role in National security,” explained Abbas Kadhim, Director of the Iraq initiative at the Atlantic Council. “His tenure witnessed too many avoidable security collapses.”
Although Maliki angrily denounced Abadi’s 2014 appointment as prime minister, which ended his eight-year rule, Fayyadh joined Abadi’s office, despite the rivalry with Maliki. Abadi even expanded his NSA portfolio with the PMC chairman role. Fayyadh transitioned from Maliki to Abadi because he “kept his head down” and avoided public controversies, said Kirk Sowell, who publishes the newsletter Inside Iraqi Politics. Fayyadh’s ability to work with the rival prime ministers who had dramatically different governing philosophies further highlighted his pragmatic character interested in retaining his posts over promoting a hardline ideology.
In exchange for Ataa leaving Abadi’s Nasr bloc, Hadi Al-Amiri’s Fatah Alliance, who won second place in the elections and whose alliance consists of Iranian-backed Shi’a parties aligned with paramilitary fighters, reportedly promised to compensate Fayyadh with the Ministry of Interior, a top security post. Prime Minister Abd Al-Mahdi managed to successfully pass 14 ministers through Parliament on October 24 2018. However, lawmakers from Muqtada Al-Sadr’s bloc along with Abadi’s Nasr alliance stormed out of parliament preventing Fayyadh’s confirmation along with seven other ministers due to Sadr’s insistence that ministerial nominees not be partisan or sectarian. A Member of Parliament affiliated with Asayb Ahl Al-Haq political coalition, Sadiqoon Al-Niyabiya responded, “Rejecting Falih Al-Fayyadh as interior minister was not justified. He led the PMF in defeating Da’ish and this is the least reward he should get.”
Once again, Abd Al-Mahdi nominated Fayyadh to serve as interior minister on December 4 under pressure from Amiri. Undeterred, lawmakers from Sadr’s bloc blocked the prime minister’s maneuver in a rowdy session and chanted after Fayyadh’s nomination, “our decision is Iraqi,” hinting at Fayyadh’s ties with Iran.
Fayyadh became a symbol for the divisions between Iraq’s two largest political camps. Former Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki and head of the State of Law bloc warned in December, “We will not permit the Bina coalition or even Prime Minister Adil Abd Al-Mahdi to replace interior minister-nominee Falih Al-Fayyadh” charging that switching Fayyadh would demonstrate Sadr’s bloc “imposing its will” on parliament “unconstitutionally.”
Renad Mansour, Research Fellow at Chatham House who moderated a Baghdad panel with Fayyadh on Iraqi security earlier this month, noted that with the ambiguity regarding the strength the Bina and Ishah coalitions the “appointment of Fayyadh [to interior minister] is one of the only ways to count who is calling the shots.”
As PMC Chairman, Fayyadh developed strong ties with Iranian officials. He obtained the support of Tehran’s closest allies for the interior post including Amiri, who also serves as Badr head. Fayyadh used one of his first trips after he reassumed his NSA post under Abd Al-Mahdi for a sensitive diplomatic mission meeting with Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad on December 29. Fayyadh hand-delivered a letter to Assad from the Iraqi Prime Minister calling for boosting bilateral ties. But, in a bid to balance Baghdad’s ties amid regional rivalries, Fayyadh visited Riyadh on January 31 to meet with senior Saudi officials.
Sadr and the Islah coalition have vowed to block his candidacy at all costs. Comparing Fayyadh’s move to US politics, Kadhim asked, “How would the GOP feel if a group of Republican Senators switched to the Democratic party and changed the Senate majority?” Given the criticisms of the last administration, Sadr insisted that no senior official from the previous government, including Fayyadh, be allowed to serve again in a sensitive ministerial role, Kadhim noted.
For the Bina coalition, Fayyadh’s candidacy has also been critical. Mansour noted that should Amiri fail to confirm Fayyadh, it would make the Badr head look weak given his claim to leading parliament’s largest coalition. “It is a very much zero-sum mentality that has led to this negotiation that has basically stalled without any room to compromise,” Mansour added.
Even if Fayyadh loses out on his interior minister-bid due to Sadr’s opposition, he would likely stay on as NSA, PMC Chairman and head the INSS given Abd Al-Mahdi’s weak stature without a political base in parliament, heavy reliance on the Islah and Bina coalitions. “The idea of firing Fayyadh, I find it hard to conceive him [Abd Al-Mahdi] doing that,” noted Sowell. “He would make all sorts of enemies that he doesn’t have the ability to push back against.”
For nearly a decade, Fayyadh has crisscrossed Iraq’s political spectrum as NSA and remained a force within Baghdad’s politics. But, Fayyadh’s interior minister nomination has come with a cost. Abd Al-Mahdi’s government faces numerous challenges including soaring unemployment, Da’ish insurgency, and stalled reconstruction. A Baghdad-based Western diplomat explained, “This debate on his candidacy is paralyzing the entire government formation process and consuming all of the political oxygen.”
Aaron Magid
Aaron Magid is an Iraq analyst at Tesla Government. A former Amman-based journalist, his articles have appeared in Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy and Al-Monitor.