The Gulf Crisis and the Blockade of Qatar

As Qatar continues to play a pivotal political role in the region, the other Gulf states have watched developments with a degree of trepidation. The year 2013 was a pivotal point in Qatar’s foreign policy as the protest movements began to ebb away not only as a result of the setbacks they suffered, but also because of the complexities of the political and social matrix in the Arab countries. This new atmosphere helped Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt to face up to Qatar once again by supporting the changes in Egypt wrought by the military coup on the one hand, and the Syrian regime’s survival and its steadfastness, on the other. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain called on Qatar to support the military coup in Egypt, but the Qataris took a different view, which was one of the main reasons that triggered the crisis between them in 2014.

The political situation in the region, following the recent upheavals, made the Gulf States feel that the United States had abandoned its allies in the region, especially in light of the US-Iranian rapprochement under President Barack Obama in the aftermath of the nuclear accord in 2015. The Gulf states suddenly felt exposed; which prompted them to set aside their differences with Qatar and to invite the latter to join the Arab alliance in the war against Yemen. They also asked Qatar to provide media, financial and military support. However, two weeks after the start of the military campaign against Yemen, the Gulf’s attitude towards Qatar suddenly changed and the dispute erupted again. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates resumed their past hostility and mobilised both Arab and Western media against Qatar in the run up to the 2017 Riyadh summit in an attempt to marginalize the Qatari presence.

After overcoming the initial psychological and financial trauma, Qatar strengthened its security ties with both the United States and Turkey and expanded diplomatic and trade relations with its global partners, especially its trade links with the Iranians, and generally expanded its economic links. This had a positive effect overall on Qatar in that the sanctions did not overwhelm its domestic economy in the way it had been envisaged, however, the degree of cooperation with third countries further widened the rift between Qatar and the blockading countries.

Based on this premise, the launch of the UAE-Saudi axis in June of 2017 was aimed at curbing Qatar’s political and economic independence, which were seen as an obstacle to their broader strategic ambitions. The move was deemed necessary, in so far as the blockade exposed longstanding and deep divisions amongst the axis partners which in the past had undermined cooperation between the Gulf States and stifled it for decades. The economic stranglehold by the axis countries over Qatar played a prominent role, whose primary purpose was to weaken Qatar’s economy gradually by instigating a slow-burning economic war and manipulating Doha’s internal and external circumstances to make it vulnerable to collapse. “The blockading countries have sought to weaken Doha, exert pressure on its capacity so that it accedes to their demands; and engineer the weakening of the Qatari riyal and sovereign bonds, induce the flight of foreign investment, the collapse of the stock market, a rise in commodity prices, the disruption of infrastructure projects and the disruption of its strategic energy sector.”

But what in fact transpired was quite unexpected – indeed almost the opposite happened. The countries conducting the blockade emerged as the biggest losers, most notably due to the cost of the war against Yemen by the Arab Alliance and other participating countries who were involved in the Doha crisis. All this propelled Qatar to introduce measures and policies to limit the economic impact of the crisis. The most notable measures included “injecting approximately $39 billion to compensate deposits by the citizens of the blockading countries residing in Qatar” who suffered losses in the banking sector and required the Qatari government to intervene directly, to compensate them. This helped to keep the exchange rates from collapsing; prevented the private banks from declaring bankruptcy; stopped capital flight abroad; and avoided the stock market’s decline and collapse. The large and rapid injection by the Qatari government of foreign currency into the financial markets allowed the Qatari government to limit the repercussions of the crisis on its economy.

The success of the Qatari crisis-management model

In the wake of the Gulf crisis between the blockading countries and Qatar, with its unforeseen repercussions for all the countries involved, it quickly became evident that Doha would be facing numerous headaches as a result of this crisis and will in all likelihood suffer greatly economically, politically and socially, as well as having to deal with security concerns. Notwithstanding, the realistic approach adopted by the Qatari government in respect of these matters and the counter-measures taken by them greatly diminished the potentially damaging impact; or at least minimised the country’s potential losses. The government initiated a series of economic counter-measures – as explained above – to deal with any matter that could potentially lead to the collapse of Doha, and also sought to “plug the food shortage gap caused by the closure of the land crossing with Saudi Arabia, by initiating local production on the one hand, and the diversification of import sources of every-day commodities on the other, with the assistance of the Qatar Airways fleet.”

Those closely observing Qatari policy over the past 10 years have found that the government has sought to diversify its sources of income by relying on energy resources, especially gas, as well as working on developing maritime navigation and the opening of additional ports. These policies have contributed to the mitigation of the effects of the blockade at the economic level. According to Qatar’s Government Communications Office (GCO), “Doha’s external trade increased by 16% in 2017 compared to the years before the crisis.” The crisis has also been an important turning point in Qatar’s general economic, political and security policies.

The Gulf crisis paved the way for the entry of one the of regional players on the side of Qatar, namely Turkey. This has perhaps also helped to redefine certain aspects of the crisis. Doha has sought to “revive the defence agreement between Turkey and Qatar and allow Turkey to send advance troops to the Qatari al-Rayyan base.” This sent a clear signal, both domestically and overseas, that Doha was capable of breaking the siege imposed on it, which was supposed to undermine its role and isolate it regionally and internationally, and not least the role played by Turkey in the crisis in allaying the fears of foreign companies with investments in Doha. The Iranians also played a prominent role in providing relief for Qatar from the Gulf crisis through facilitating alternative sea routes for Qatar’s shipping and by opening up its airspace. Iran’s exports to Qatar in 2016 were estimated at $103 million, while Qatar’s exports to Iran amounted to $11 million, with food and building materials accounting for about 73% of Iranian exports to Qatar.

The Iraqi position towards the crisis

It is in the nature of crises, with an international dimension, between international entities operating within the international order, that they divide the parties to the conflict or dispute into two camps, with multiple parties on both sides. In the Gulf crisis involving Qatar, there was support for Qatar from parties such as Iran and Turkey; whilst other parties stood behind Saudi Arabia, against Qatar, such as Egypt, Bahrain and the UAE (the blockading countries). A third party which remains outside the two camps is a neutral party and normally distances itself from the conflict. This is what Iraq did during the Gulf crisis. It took a neutral position on the issue, believing that becoming entangled may be detrimental to its interests in the region. When the crisis first unfolded, Iraq was still slowly recovering from the aftermath of defeating terrorism and working on a united international front towards the crises in the region, as well as working on taking an equal stance towards its regional neighbours through its comprehensive foreign policy.

The prime minister at the time, Haider al-Abadi, stated that “his country is against the policy of imposing an embargo against any state, even one it did not agree with, and called for the cessation of support for terrorism by all States.” Moreover, the Iraqi position was supportive of stability in the region and called for the need not to create a security vacuum which armed groups will seek to exploit in order to destabilize the internal security and stability of countries in the region. Iraq also sought to adopt an unbiased position towards all parties to the Gulf conflict, despite the pressure exerted by some Gulf States on Iraq to change its position towards Qatar. Iraq refrained from taking sides and refused to align itself with any party to the crisis, and this is “What was described as the official response to the repeated pressure exerted by the blockading countries on Iraq to side with the blockade camp.”

Conclusion

The countries blockading Qatar continue to blame the latter for the collapse in relations between the Gulf states, despite the fact that Qatar has increasingly been seeking to minimise its significance. However, this collapse is not amenable to an easy solution as the fault lines between the Gulf states are deep and unprecedented in their scope, with no end in sight for the long-term repercussions.

In addition, the ongoing crisis has been primarily instrumental in helping Qatar achieve economic independence because from the outset, the crisis was economic rather than political in nature, intended as it was to subordinate Doha to the will of the blockading countries. Moreover, we find that the complex circumstances that Qatar experienced – and which it continues to experience – increased the difficulty for political decisions, for it is located in a turbulent region geographically, as it is surrounded by Iran and Saudi Arabia. This has motivated Qatar to find suitable alternatives to the normal decision-making process through non-traditional mechanisms to enable it to protect the state entity and its sovereignty in the face of this crisis.

Qatar has weathered the crisis with political rationality by engaging with systematic planning for the management of the crisis through official channels, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and unofficial ones, such as media outlets, humanitarian institutions and research centres through which it was able to invest in an appropriate, balanced and flexible expression of its position; it thus gained regional and international sympathy for itself. Whilst managing the crisis, Qatar also influenced public opinion abroad through the frequent overseas trips by Prince Tamim bin Hamad, on the one hand, and Foreign Minister, Mohammed bin Abdul Rahman al-Thani, on the other. Qatar also focussed its efforts on ratifying agreements with Russia, Turkey and the Southeast Asian countries in various political, economic, cultural, commercial and security fields. This allowed Doha to handle the crisis and to absorb its effects gradually, to contain it and to adopt systematic methods of responding at the regional and international levels. It maintained its stance on Arab and Islamic issues and adopted a unified approach towards international issues through effective and constructive diplomacy. Qatar also demonstrated its willingness to sit down to discuss and to negotiate over the points of dispute and work towards resolving them. At this juncture, we must not forget the role played by Kuwait in mediating between the blockading countries and Qatar for an end to the crisis by peaceful means.

Short of some sort of calamity befalling one or many of the countries consumed by the crisis, expectations towards the resolution of the crisis remain the same, with no immediate changes expected on the political scene. Moreover, an analysis of the potential outcome between Saudi Arabia and Qatar will remain that the former has been unable to adopt a firm stance towards the crisis nor has it been able to suborn the political scene in its favour; all because of the great difference between Qatar’s overseas initiatives towards this crisis and the results on the ground which indicate that Saudi Arabia has not been able to exert influence anywhere near the same extent. Saudi Arabia has sought to persuade certain other countries, despite not sharing any common interests with them, to sever diplomatic ties with Qatar such as the Comoros Islands and Sudan. There is also the arms deal between the United States and Qatar, which has contributed to the strengthening of Qatar’s relations with the United States and also pre-empted a potential collision with Trump’s new policy in the region. In light of the foregoing, it is now evident that the conflict or crisis is no longer an Arab issue only but also a regional and international one, which only serves to further complicate the ongoing crisis.